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Abstract
In this paper we describe a model of optimal investment of various types of financially 
constrained firms. We show that the resulting relationship between internal funds and 
investment is non-monotonic. In particular, the magnitude of the cash flow sensitivity of the 
investment is lower for firms with credit rationing compared to firms that are able to obtained 
short-term external financing. The inverse relationship is driven by the leverage multiplier 
effect. A positive cash flow shock increases the short-term borrowing capacity of the firm, 
which in turn has a positive effect on investment and firm's growth. Moreover, the leverage 
multiplier effect is the highest for firms relying on short-term credits and it is lower for firms 
that are able to obtain long-term financing. Analysing a large euro area data set we find strong 
empirical support for our theoretical predictions. The results also help to explain some 
contrasting findings in the financial constraints literature.
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Understanding firms' investment decisions under imperfect market conditions is one of 
the central issues of financial economics. Studying firm's investment in such environment can 
provide insight into the dynamics of its growth as a function of internal and external financial 
sources. In the presence of financing constraints the firms investment vary not only with the 
availability of the profitable investment projects, but also with the internal funds (see Fazzari et 
al., 1988). Consequently, the severity of the financing constraints has been proposed to be 
measured by the magnitude of the cash flow sensitivity of investment.
However, there is debate on the interpretation of the sensitivity in the light of the 
financing constraints. Different conclusions are taken mostly because of the different ways of 
a-priori classification in financially constrained and unconstrained groups. One way to classify 
firms, proposed by Fazzari et al. (1988), is to consider them a-priori as constrained if they pay 
low dividend payout ratio. The estimated cash flow sensitivity of this group of firms is 
interpreted as an evidence of financing constraints. The lower sensitivity is taken as an 
evidence of the less severe financing conditions.1 Another possible classification is to define as 
financially constrained those firms that are in violation of debt covenants, have been cut out of 
their usual source of credit, are negotiating debt payments, or declare that they are forced to 
reduce investments because of liquidity problems (see Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). The 
classification of Kaplan-Zingales is based on the managers' report on operations, capital 
resources and liquidity (qualitative information) and financial statements and notes 
(quantitative information). Contrary to previous results, they document the highest cash flow 
sensitivity for least constrained firms. In a recent study, Moyen (2004) shows, constructing a 
simulated sample, that both results can be replicated just by changing the a-priori classification.
In this paper we continue to investigate the relationship between financing conditions 
and the sensitivity measure and propose another and more realistic classification of firms. First, 
1
 Supporting results with alternative classifications are summarised in the literature overview presented by 
Schiantarelli (1995) and Hubbard (1998).
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we argue that in the real world it is hard to identify a group of firms in the absence of the 
financing constraints. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) also argue that just considering the external
relative to the internal costs of financing we could hardly find any unconstrained firm. 
Consequently, we focus on the severity of the constraints instead of its absence or presence. 
We model the firms' cash flow sensitivity of total investment with respect to the reliance on the 
external financial sources. Further on, we differentiate firms relying mostly on short-term 
credits from those that are able to access long-term external sources assuming that long-term 
debt is more preferable for investments whenever it is available.
Some firms forgo investment rather than access capital markets. Consequently the firm 
will under-invest relative to its first best level. The reasons behind can be diverse, e.g. firm 
decide not to take the credit because of the high cost, managerial agency problem, or not 
wishing to provide private information on their projects to the financing institutions. Firms can 
face the credit rationing resulting from asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse 
selection, costly state verification or low level of tangible assets2. Therefore, we provide a 
special attention to such group of firms that rely exclusively on their internal sources, 
considering them under the worst financing conditions.
Firms with a financing need (lower cash flow than investment value) access external 
financing sources whenever is possible in order to carry out their investment projects. However 
the variability in internal sources, especially a negative shock, increases not only the likelihood 
that a firm will need additional external sources but it also decreases the likelihood to obtain 
further external financing or to get it with higher cost due to increasing risk (see Minton and 
Schrand (1999)). In such a case both borrowing and investment become endogenous. An 
increase in cash flow results in a higher borrowing capacity, which in turn allow for higher 
investment and growth (see also Carpenter and Petersen (2002), Almeida, Campello and 
2
 For theoretical discussion see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Williamson (1986), Bester (1985), Jaffee and Russell 
(1976), Sharpe (1990).
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Weisbach (2004), Almeida and Campello (2006), Lin (2007)). Consequently, we expect a
higher sensitivity of levered firms compared to those relying exclusively on internal sources. 
Moreover, we argue that the leverage multiplier effect associated with the endogenous change
deterioration of the firm’s credit capacity following the negative cash flow shock is the highest 
for those constrained firms who need to negotiate periodically their external sources (financing 
through short-term credits). Firms that are able to obtain long-term debt are assumed to be the 
least constrained or even unconstrained firms (being defined as those firms that despite of some 
market imperfections all of their positive net value projects can be financed). We expect lower
cash flow sensitivity for such firms compared to those that are financed by short-term 
borrowings. The borrowing capacity of firms able to obtain long-term debt we assume to be 
determined by factors less related to the current liquidity, but more long-term indicators such as 
credit history accumulated during the past years, stock market performance, bank-firm 
relationship, size, etc. In such case the multiplier effect is reduced or completely disappears. 
Still, the external funds could be insufficient for all of their positive net present value (NPV) 
projects and each additional cash flow would have a positive direct effect on the investment 
and growth. In optimal case, when internal and external funds are sufficient for all of their 
investment projects, investment should not vary with the internal funds. Taking in 
consideration both direct and indirect effects, we expect the cash-flow sensitivity of 
investments is to be the lowest for firms with long-term borrowing.
We test the predictions of the theoretical model using a euro-area sample. Borrowings 
from financial institutions play a special role in the European financial system. First, contrary 
to the American system, the European financial system is more bank than market oriented3. 
Private firms do not have the option to increase their capital trough new issue of shares (around 
70% of our sample) and those listed on the market rely also on the credits obtained from 
3 In 2004, bank loans represented around 90% of the total debt flows to non-financial corporations in the euro area. 
The stock market capitalization at the end of 2003 in Euro Area was 73.4%, which is significantly lower than the
US capitalization of 129.6% of GDP (source: World Federation of Exchanges).
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financial institutions as the primary source4. Second, in line with the pecking order theory of 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majful (1984), only firms, that are not able to increase their 
leverage, issue shares. Our firm classification relies on quantitative information taken from 
balance sheets and profits and lost statements, allowing the reclassification of firms' financial 
status each period. However the final analysis is in a dynamic framework and the firms' status 
in the whole period is determined conditional on its yearly changes.
We find strong empirical support for our predictions that for firms with no access to 
external financing sources an additional euro of internal cash flow results in less than a euro 
total investment in fixed and non-cash current assets. For partially constrained firms, which
have access to external financial market but with certain binding conditions in sense that they 
are able to obtain only short-term credit, an additional euro generate slightly more than an
additional one euro caused by the leverage multiplier effect. And finally, firms with available 
long-term borrowing face lower investment sensitivity on internal financing. Considering the
classifications of the previous literature, our first group of firms that relies exclusively on 
internal finance have similar characteristics to those defined as constrained by the KZ index,
Moyen's constrained model and Cleary's index (see Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Moyen (2004) 
and Cleary (1999)). Our results are similar to the findings of these studies, i.e. firms relying on
internal sources (identified as constrained) face a lower sensitivity than those that are able to 
borrow. The lower sensitivity of long-term borrowing firms compared to the short-term
borrowing firms is more in line with the Fazzari et al. (1988) findings, i.e firms facing higher 
asymmetric information problems and consequently not able to satisfy the conditions for long-
term borrowing, have higher cash flow sensitivity. Hence, we present evidence for the two 
contradictory predictions of the literature, showing that they are rather complementary.
4
 For a more detailed description of the European financial system see Ehrmann et al (2001) and Hartmann et al. 
(2003).
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the related literature of 
non-monotonic behaviour of investment-cash flow sensitivity. In Section 3 the theoretical 
model is presented. Section 4 describes the data and sample selection. In Section 5 the 
empirical test of the theoretical model’s predictions is described. Main conclusions are 
summarised in the final section.
1. Related literature
On the theoretical basis there is no sufficient condition for monotonicity in the cash 
flow sensitivity of investments with respect to firms financing conditions. A higher sensitivity 
of corporate investment to cash flow is not sufficient evidence for more severe financing 
constraints (see Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000)). Couple of recent papers present theoretical 
models supporting the non-monotonous sensitivity, however there is less clear way about its 
pattern, especially on the empirical level.
Cleary, Povel and Raith (2003) present a non-monotonic relationship between 
investment and cash flow. They show that firms with negative cash flow or zero dividends have 
the lowest sensitivity and it is the highest for firms with moderate cash flow or dividend. For 
the firms with the highest cash flow or dividend, which they considered as unconstrained, a 
lower sensitivity is estimated. Boyle and Guthrie (2003) present a dynamic model of 
investment distorted by costly external financing. They look at the relationship of investment 
timing and financing constraints showing that financing constraints can not only discourage 
investment, but also accelerate it, resulting in sub-optimal early investments. More importantly, 
an increase in cash has a smaller positive effect on the investment for constrained firms with 
low-cash than it does for constrained firms with high-cash. Dasgupta and Sengupta (2002) 
investigate with the help of a multi-period version of a standard moral hazard model the case 
when the firms have the option to allocate their liquidity inter-temporally. Their results are 
differing from the previous two studies. They argue that the responsiveness of investment to 
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changes in liquidity is the highest for low liquidity firms, least for intermediate liquidity firms 
and intermediate for the high liquidity firms. Ozkan (2002) investigates the behaviour of 
research and development investment and shows it is more sensitive to internal finance for 
financially constrained firms than for financially unconstrained firms in the US manufacturing 
sector. However, Moyen (2004) shows that the value of cash flow, just as the dividend payout 
ratio used for a-priori classification is not appropriate to distinguish firms facing different 
financing conditions.
Moyen (2004) compares the dynamic model of unconstrained relative to constrained
firm and he defines constraints based on their access to financial markets. They predict a higher 
investment cash-flow sensitivity of unconstrained firm, explained by the leverage effect. In 
their model only unconstrained firms can issue debt and they explain the higher sensitivity by
the effect of debt financing on investment that is not taken into account by the regression 
specification. Carpenter and Petersen (2002) provide also a theoretical model for the leverage 
multiplier effect. They show that the leverage effect occurs when firms’ access to debt depends 
on the collateral and each additional dollar of internal finance should generate slightly more 
than one additional dollar of growth. Similar to this explanation, Almeida and Campello (2006)
develop a theory explaining that sensitivities will decrease with financial constraints, so long as 
firms are not entirely unconstrained. They explain the decreasing sensitivity of investment by 
the cash flow borrowing capacity. They show that investment-cash flow sensitivities are 
increasing in the degree of tangibility of constrained firms’ assets and for entirely 
unconstrained firms the investment-cash flow sensitivities drop to zero. This implies that the 
relationship between capital spending and cash flows is non-monotonic. 
Our results are in line with the Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Almeida and 
Campello (2006) theoretical model predictions. Since Almeida and Campello (2006) show that 
the multiplier effect is increasing with project’s tangibility, we show that such multiplier effect 
depends on the type of borrowing. We contribute to the literature of non-monotonic sensitivity, 
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by differentiating the firms with short versus long-term financing. The endogenous multiplier 
effect increases the sensitivity of short-term borrowing firms relative to those that rely 
exclusively on internal financial sources. However, for those firms that are able to get long-
term debt, the borrowing capacity is less dependent on the current cash flow shocks, but rather
by “long-term” firm characteristics, like credit history, size and bank-firm relationship. In this
case the indirect effect of cash flow on investments is less significant or even disappears. In
addition, the direct effect of cash flow is expected to be less significant, since firms are able to 
make the long-term investment plans relying on long-term borrowings, weakening the reliance 
of investment on internal financing. The non-monotonic relationship of the theoretical literature 
relies partially on the existence of the totally unconstrained firms. Contrary to simulated 
sample, where unconstrained firms by definition have zero sensitivity, in real world none of the 
firms operate in perfect market conditions. The non-monotonic relationship theoretically 
derived in this paper is valid under the conditions of market imperfections and instead of 
perfectly unconstrained firms, that we consider unrealistic, we define firms with the best 
financing conditions those that are able to obtain the cheaper long-term external financing.
2. Theoretical model
In order to discuss the investment-cash flow sensitivity in the light of financial constraints 
let us give some more clear distinction of constrained firms. As it was already mentioned 
before, it is quite difficult to find in real world a group of absolutely unconstrained firms. It 
looks more realistic to determine the degree of the financing constraints based on the 
accessibility to different types of external financial sources. A firm is assumed to be absolutely 
constrained if it cannot issue or take any debt and its own internal sources are not enough to 
cover the optimal investment value (a firm which can self-finance all positive net present value 
projects is considered to be unconstrained). We consider a firm to be partially constrained if it 
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9
has no possibility to issue or contract long-term debts but can rely on the short-term credits. 
And the least constrained firms are those that are able to issue or contract debts with long-term 
maturity. Investment project financing is always preferable the long-term borrowings rather 
than short-term borrowings due to the renegotiation costs and the risk of early liquidation.
We consider the model with a firm that will finance a long-term project (two periods in 
this context). The project’s investment starts at time 0 and at the end of the second period the 
firm collects the revenues )( 0IF , where the production function ++ ! RRF :  is twice 
differentiable strictly concave (i.e. 0'' <F ) and it is increasing ( 0' >F ).There are two 
alternative sources of financing:, that is internally by using the cash flow (CF) and externally
by borrowing funds (D) from creditors. We also assume that the firm cannot invest into the 
project the whole amount of the cash flow. For liquidity reasons it saves CF" , where 1<" , 
under the form of cash or highly liquid assets. 
Let us consider now the investment policies of the unconstrained and our three types of 
constrained firms.
Unconstrained firms with sufficient internal sources: The optimal investment can be 
calculated as the solution of the profit maximization problem. 
max,)( 00 !# IIF CFI )1(0 "#$ .
This implies that the optimal investment of the firm is *0 II
l
=  if 
"#
%
1
*ICF , where 
)1()( 1'* #= FI  is the first-best investment – the solution of the unconstrained maximization 
problem max)( 00 !# IIF . In this case we implicitly suppose that the firm can issue debt but 
does not do because it has enough internal sources to finance its project. Consequently, the 
cash flow sensitivity of the investment under no financing constraints is:
00 =
&
&
=
CF
ISens
l
l
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I. Absolutely constrained firms: Internal sources are not sufficient, i.e. its cash flow 
available for investment is less than the first best investment, *)1( ICF <#" . This group of 
firms cannot issue any debts. The profit function 00 )( IIF #  is increasing on the interval ),0( *I
(see Figure 1) and the maximization problem of this type of firm can be written as: 
CFI
IIF
)1(
max,)(
0
00
"#$
!#
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Its solution for the amount of investment is: CFI a )1(0 "#= , and the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is:
110 <#=
&
&
= "
CF
ISens
a
a .
II. Partially constrained firms: The insufficient internal sources, 
"#
<
1
*ICF , can be 
compensated by the issue of short-term debts. Firms financed by short-term debts need to 
renegotiate its credit contracts at time 1 or to find another credit in order to pay the financial 
obligations. We assume that the negotiation costs are fixed and smaller than the saved amount 
of cash, CF" , so these reserves can be used at time 1 for contract renegotiation. 
We assume that borrowing capacity is a function of the project tangibility (see also 
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Almeida and Campalo (2006)). The project can be 
liquidated at time 1 and its liquidation value is equal to 0qI , with 1<q . Due to the risk of the 
project’s default the bank is not willing to lend more than the liquidation value of the project 
plus the cash savings of the firm. In this case the firm is faced with a debt constraint of the 
form: 0qICFD +$ " . We assume that the maximum total financing of the partially
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constrained firm is *max)1( IDCF <+#"  and the profit function, defined as 00 )( IIF #  is 
increasing on the interval ),0( *I . When *II = , the firm is assumed to have an infinitely elastic
borrowing capacity and consequently enter the category of least constrained firms (III). The 
maximization problem of the partially constrained firms is:
0
0
00
,)1(
max,)(
qICFD
DCFI
IIF
+$
+#$
!#
"
"
We conclude that the optimal investment for the partially constrained firms is 
q
CFI p
#
=
10
 and 
the investment-cash flow sensitivity of this type of firm equals:
1
1
10 >
#
=
&
&
=
qCF
ISens
p
p .
III. Least constrained firms: Firms with available long-term debts do not face the
problem of renegotiation risk and do not pay the fixed costs of the credit contract at time 1. For 
this type of firms the borrowing capacity is assumed to be less dependent on the project 
tangibility, but rather on other characteristics, like size, firms’ tangibility, credit history, 
quotation on the stock market or bank-firm relationship. Technically, we assume that: 
qq
CF
CFB
<'=
&
& )(
.
Thus, the least constrained firm solves the maximization problem: 
).(
,)1(
max,)(
0
00
CFBD
DCFI
IIF
$
+#$
!#
"
The optimal investment *0 II
l
=  if *)()1( ICFBCF %+#"  (the global maximum *I  of 
the function 00 )( IIF #  lies within the constraint interval ))()1(,0( CFBCF +#"  and 
)()1(0 CFBCFI l +#= "  if *)()1( ICFBCF <+#" . Hence, the optimal investment-cash flow 
sensitivity of the least constrained firm can be described as: 
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(
)
* %+#
'+#
=
&
&
=
.
,)()1(
,1
,0 *0
otherwise
ICFBCF
qCF
ISens
l
l
"
"
In summary we can conclude that 
... cleastcpartiallycabsolutely SensSensSens >< , i.e. the 
partially constrained firms are expected to have always the highest sensitivity. Firms relying on 
the long-term debts are expected to have the lowest sensitivity, however it depends on the 
percentage of firms that are able to finance most of their positive net value projects with the 
help of external financing. Our model shows a non-monotonic investment-cash flow sensitivity 
with respect to financing constraints even in the case when all firms faces some under-
financing problem (the direct effect of cash flow on investment is always present for the 
companies with underfinanced projects).
3. Data
3.1. Sample construction 
We use a comprehensive database of euro area firms collected from the AMADEUS 
database of Bureau van Dijk. Amadeus contains financial information on about 2.6 millions
private and publicly owned firms across euro area countries. Data is created by collecting 
standardised data received from vendors of each European country. In addition to financial 
information, the 4-digit NACE code, which is the European standard of industry classification, 
is also given. We select for our study only those firms that provide the consolidated balance 
sheets resulting in a sample of about 26,000 firms. The consolidated annual accounts are
selected because these are considered to be the most suitable format for providing information 
about the financial situation of the parent company since the true financial boundaries of firms 
are at group level and not at individual plants. It takes in consideration the financial interest and 
the net assets owned by the parent in subsidiaries that will contribute to future earnings and 
dividends. Additionally, the consolidated accounts make our study more comparable across the 
results of the previous literature.
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The time period covered is 1990-2004, however we exclude the first four years because 
of the poor coverage and an additional year is lost by constructing the variables of interest as 
the first difference of the balance sheet items. We exclude firms operating in financial services 
industries (Nace code 65 and 66) because its financial ratios are not comparable to those of 
non-financial companies. In addition, we drop several country-specific industries, like the 
Agriculture (Nace code 1), Forestry (Nace code 2), Fishing (Nace code 5) and Mining (Nace 
code 10-14) industry sectors. Finally, we drop the government/public sector, Education, Health 
and social sector like activities of organizations, private households and extra-territorial 
organizations, and firms that cannot be classified (NACE codes 75, 80, 85, 91, 92, 95 and 99).
We apply several quality checks on the data. Only those firms are selected that provide 
information on the total assets and sales. The sample size is further reduced after checking the 
reported balance-sheet items of selected firms to be positive and that the sum of the 
subcategories of a balance-sheet item not to differ more than 5% from the reported value of the 
item. Finally, we exclude firms that are inactive. We apply a 1% trimming of the variables of 
main interest: logarithm of total assets, total assets growth, sales growth, total investment, cash 
flow to beginning of period total assets and short/long term borrowings to the beginning of year
total assets. We retain only those firms that report data for, at least, three consecutive years. 
The main sample consists of 5,131 firms with 31,499 observations (for a detailed sample 
selection see Appendix).
Amadeus is especially useful because of its large coverage of both public and private 
firms (80% of total sample), however it faces some limitations. The coverage varies across euro 
area countries reflecting the peculiarities of European accounting legislation and its 
heterogeneity across countries. For example, Greek firms do not provide consolidated items 
and data on Irish firms were filtered out by the quality controls due to the low coverage. 
Austrian and Luxembourgian firms has a very low coverage. The Netherlands and Finland are 
over-represented due to statutory reporting requirements of the consolidated statements.
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Countries such as France, Italy and Spain are well covered by the sample (for a detailed cross-
country coverage of the sample see Appendix).
3.2. Firms’ classification
While there is a consensus to consider financially constrained firms those that face 
difficulties in obtaining external finance, there is no clear way to identify these firms a-priori 
and the posterior sensitivity measures are influenced by the alternative a-priori classification.
Just as Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue, the definition of financial constraints based on the 
cost of internal and external financing is the most precise one but also the broadest as well. 
Based on this definition almost all firms can be classified as constrained, just considering the 
transaction costs of external financing. However there is a significant difference among firms 
with respect to their accessibility to external financing, which in turn affect their corporate
investment policy and their growth. Our classification do not measure the internal relative to 
external costs but it capture cross-sectional differences in financing conditions defined as the 
availability of the external financial sources. Since all firms face the imperfect market 
conditions on some degree we propose a new classification instead of the traditional 
constrained-unconstrained classification. We identify three different types of firms: I) firms 
relying mostly on internal financial sources noted as absolutely constrained firms, II) firms 
relying on short-term external sources with maturity less than one year, noted as partially 
constrained, and III) firms relying on external financial sources in form of long-term borrowing
with maturity above one year, considered as the least constrained firms. We classify firm-years 
in the first category, only when there is a sign of constraints, i.e. of the firm facing a financing 
need (higher investment value than current cash flow) but despite of this it cannot get external 
sources and needs to use the cash savings from the previous periods or it is even forced to 
liquidate its assets. We assume that firms with long-term projects would always prefer long-
term instead of short-term borrowings because of the additional renegotiation costs and 
additional renegotiation risk that would force early liquidation of the investment project.
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Moreover, firms with higher borrowing costs tend to use less external finance than firms under 
favourable condition. However, we are not able to determine precisely, whether such firms 
with long-term borrowings are able to finance all of their positive net value projects but we can 
expect them to be closer to their optimal investment than those firms belonging to the other 
previously defined two groups and consequently, we can consider them the least constrained 
firms. Table 1 summarizes the criteria used in the classification and the cross-groups firm-year 
distribution.
[Insert Table 1 here]
After having classified each observation we apply a dynamic view of constraints. For 
this, we look at the characteristics used as classification criteria to be present for minimum of
three consecutive years and in the most of the available years of the given company (total 
number of years divided by two plus one). In order to classify a firm as absolutely constrained, 
the majority of its firm-years but minimum of three consecutive years should satisfy the 
condition of exclusive reliance on internal financial sources despite of the financing need or 
they liquidate their assets. The firm is considered as partially constrained, if minimum of three 
consecutive years and in majority of its available years was categorised as partially or 
absolutely constrained. The least constrained firms are those that are not included in the 
previous two categories and consequently for such firms the financial constraints do not persist 
for more than half of the available years and less than 3 consecutive years. The final outcome 
of the classification is presented in Table 2 and the regression analyses are based on this 
dynamic firm classification.
[Insert Table 2 here]
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4. Empirical test
To gain some first insight into the firms’ characteristics and their financing condition, 
key characteristics of the three firm-groups of the three groups are reported in Table 3. 
Differences in mean values of the variables among the firm-groups are tested based on the t 
statistic. 
[Insert Table 3 here]
The first variable presented in Table 3 indicates that firms that rely less intensively on 
external financing are relatively smaller firms. The growth of total assets (2nd variable) is 
significantly higher for the firms with financial debt. Less risky firms get better financing, thus 
have less impediment in their growth. This relationship is important with respect to one of the 
main critic addressed to the sensitivity measure. Previous studies emphases that the magnitude 
of the sensitivities, which should measure the presence of financing constrained is actually 
reflecting future investment opportunities and it is higher for growing firms (see Ericson and 
Whited (2000), Alti (2003), Bond et al. (2004)). Thus the cash flow sensitivity could reflect the 
future investment opportunity, not efficiently captured by other proxies like Tobins’ Q or sales 
growth. If the hidden investment opportunities would rule the investment-cash flow sensitivity
of our sample, we should estimate a monotonic increase in sensitivity from absolutely to least 
constrained firms. If is any distortion caused by future investment opportunity, this would 
result in a higher increase of sensitivity of least constrained firms. A higher growth of the 
relatively less constrained firms has been documented also by Cleary (1999) and Whited and 
Wu (2004). They classify firms based on the dividend cuts and an index measuring the shadow 
cost associated with raising new equity (the cost of external finance relative to internal 
finance), respectively. 
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The significantly higher sales growth (3rt variable) of less constrained firms could be 
specific for the euro area firms. The euro area of the given period is characterised by a progress 
towards integration of financial system, not only in the area of money markets but also in bond 
markets, equity markets and banking. Related policy initiatives provide the opportunity for 
both new- and well-established firms to new directions of development.5 This mean that 
possible investment projects are above the internal financial sources and any additional external 
financing is able to increase their productivity and sales. Mizen and Vermeulen (2005) suggest 
using sales growth as a-priori classification criteria for some European firms, since the high 
sales’ growth could be an indicator of financial health and future profitability that opens up 
access to external financing.
The lower cash flows (4rt variable) of absolutely constrained firms confirm our 
assumption that the negative or zero borrowings are caused by the difficulties in obtaining
external sources and not because of the abundant cash flow that is enough to finance all the 
projects. The yearly changes in the amount of short- and long-term credits (5ft and 6th
variables) are the proxies of the new external sources used as a classification criteria and the 
mean values reflect the outcome of the firms’ classification. More importantly, the leverage (7th
variable) is higher for less constrained firms, indicating that these firms rely on external
financial sources more intensively even in the period before the sample time-period. The lower 
leverage of the more constrained firms is in line with the findings of Faulkender and Petersen 
(2003). They argue that the availability of incremental capital depends on the risk of the firm’s 
cash flows and characteristics of the firm. Consequently, firms with barriers to some external 
sources are under-levered. The unconstrained firms simulated by Moyen (2004) take on more
more debt than constrained firms since they can respond to income shocks by varying their 
debt level.
5
 For a more detailed description of the euro area financial structure integration see Hartmann, Maddaloni and 
Manganelli (2003).
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Based on the leverage (7th variable) and the proxy for the cost of credits (8th variable) we 
find that less constrained firms despite of the higher leverage face lower financing costs. The 
bankruptcy cost of leverage suggests a positive relationship, in sense that higher leverage 
increases the bankruptcy risk and the higher risk should be compensated by higher interest. 
However, reliable, less risky firms should be able to increase their leverage without increase in 
its costs. Our data suggest that on the one hand, firms with long-term borrowing are less risky 
firms and consequently they are able to increase their leverage with lower cost. On the other 
hand, firms with short-term borrowings and relying mostly on their internal sources in the 
selected period (absolutely constrained) are under-levered. Absolutely constrained firms pay 
the highest cost for the credit obtained prior to the sample period and this could also explain 
why they do not take any further credit obligations.
The principal specification that we use to test the prediction of the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity of the selected three types of firms is an error correction model and it is specified as 
follows:
[ ]
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where the dependent variable is the total investment of the firm i at time t , measured as the 
change in fixed and non-cash current assets plus depreciation divided by the beginning of 
period total assets. Total investment includes beside the fixed investments the investment in 
current assets. Hence, the sensitivity is not effected by the temporally fluctuations of the 
investments through the draw down of working capital (see Carpenter and Petersen (2002)).
tiCF ,  denotes the current cash flow calculated as the profit for the period (profit after tax plus 
extraordinary profit)  plus depreciation and 
tiSales ,log- is the first difference of the logarithm 
of sales, the proxy for firms’ investment opportunities. The regression is controlled for time-, 
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industry- and country- effects by inclusion of the corresponding dummy variables, yearD , industryD , 
and
countryD  respectively and ti,+  is a random disturbance. Since we focus on both public and 
private firms (for which the market value is not available), the expected profitability is 
controlled, instead of the Tobin’s Q, by current sales growth, specific to the error correction 
models used by previous literature (see for instance Bond et al. (2004), Fuss and Vermuelen 
(2004)). The sales growth, just as the cash flow - relative to the Tobin’s Q - can capture 
relatively newer information obtained within the year about the running projects of the firm 
based on which the manager decides about the new investment and revise the target capital 
stock accordingly (for theoretical model see Alti (2003)). 
Estimating the dynamic structure of the growth, the lag value of dependent variable is also used 
as an explanatory variable. In addition, the model includes the error correction term, 
constructed as the difference between logarithm values of total assets and sales in the first lags 
multiplied by the 0.8 (the estimated long-term relationship among sales and non-cash total 
assets).
Table 4 presents the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values 
of the variables used for the regression. The median firm has a yearly investment representing
10% of the beginning of year total assets, which drops to 5% for absolutely constrained firms. 
The median firm has a cash flow of 9% of the beginning of period total assets and a sales 
growth of 6%. The annual growth of net working capital counts on average 1.2% of the total 
assets. Mean and median values do not differ significantly and the minimum and maximum 
values suggests that none of the coefficient estimates of the regressions can be influenced by 
the presence of outliers. 
[Insert Table 4 here]
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Based on the theoretical model, the quantitative predictions of the cash flow sensitivity 
of absolutely constrained firms is less than one. The only source of financing is represented by 
cash flow; however a part of it is reoriented to precautionary cash savings or credit repayments. 
For partially constrained firms the sensitivity is expected to be slightly higher than one 
resulting from the leverage multiplier effect. And finally, for the least constrained firms a lower 
cash flow coefficient is expected, caused by the favourable financing contract less dependent 
on current cash flow variation (indirect effect) and by the possibility that all long-term 
investment projects of the firm to be covered by the available financial sources (direct effect).
In Table 5 the regression results of the two-step system GMM estimates are presented. 
The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Firm-specific effects are first removed by 
calculating the first differences specific to the GMM estimation. The third lagged values of 
endogenous variables are valid instruments since there is no serial correlation in the time-
varying component of the error terms of the equation. This condition is met, since the test for 
serial correlation in the first difference residuals is rejected based on the test for second-order 
autocorrelation (the first-order autocorrelation is expected due to model specification). The
validity of the used instruments is also accepted based on the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions.
[Insert Table 5 here]
In each of the three samples the cash flow coefficient is statistically significant and it 
strongly supports the quantitative predictions of the model. The point estimate for cash flow in 
the case of absolutely constrained firms is 0.96. For the partially constrained firms the cash 
flow coefficients of 1.15 is consistent with the presence of the leverage multiplier effect. And 
for the least constrained firms the cash flow coefficient is again lower, with the point estimates 
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of 0.79.6 This lower coefficient is consistent with the models’ prediction that the better credit 
contracts should reduce the investment dependence on internal finance.
The coefficient of the sales growth is highly significant for least constrained firms and 
significant under 5% confidence level for the partially and absolutely constrained firms. The 
negative coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, however not statistically significant, 
suggests a mean-reversion of the investment rate. The error correction terms are negative as
expected, however not statistically significant. As a robustness test we use an alternative 
specification for the error correction term and re-estimate the equation (1). The error correction
term (Err.Corr.Term) is the first lagged estimated residuals of the equation:
tiititi sTA ,,,log +/0" +++= , (2)
where 1,log #tiTA and tis , refer to the logarithm of total assets and sales. i/ and ti,+ represent the 
firm fixed effects and a random disturbance, respectively. Results are presented in Table 6. The 
cash flow sensitivity of investment has the same pattern as in the case of previous estimation, 
with higher coefficient for partially constrained firms of 1.34. The coefficient of absolutely and 
least constrained firms is about 0.95. The coefficients of the error correction terms is higher, 
given that the value of the estimated residual is lower than the assets-sales difference, however 
statistically still not significant. We can conclude that using alternative error correction 
specification our main results of the cash flow sensitivity is not affected.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we develop a theoretical model that makes quantitative predictions about 
the magnitude of the cash flow-investment sensitivity in the light of financing constraints. 
Relying on a sample of more than 5,000 euro area firms we document a non-monotonic 
6
 The magnitude of the sensitivity is higher than those presented in most of the financing constraints literature.  his 
is simply caused by the fact that our dependent variable is the investment in total assets instead of the investment 
in fixed assets. The magnitude of the coefficient is more comparable with the results presented by Carpenter and 
Petersen (2002), using the firm’s growth as a dependent variable.
Page 21 of 33
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
F
o
r P
eer R
eview
22
investment-cash flow sensitivity, which strongly support the models' predictions. The 
explanation for the higher sensitivity of partially constrained firms relative to the absolutely 
constrained is twofold. First, only a part of internal sources are invested, since there is a need of 
precautionary cash savings for liquidity reasons. Second, investments increase the borrowing 
capacity of the firm, so the amount of credits depends also on cash flow shocks. Through this 
indirect leverage effect, an additional dollar of internal finance will generate slightly more than 
an additional dollar of total investment. These findings are in line with the amplification effect 
of Almeida and Campello (2006) and the leverage effect presented by Carpenter and Petersen 
(2002) and Moyen (2004). Moreover, we identify a group of the least constrained firms able to 
borrow long-term cheap sources, for which the sensitivity is lower than those with less 
favourable credit contracts (only short-term borrowings are available). We find evidence that 
the favourable financing contracts are less dependent on current cash flow shocks (indirect 
effect) and/or some of these firms are able to finance most of their positive net value projects
with the help of external financing but internal sources remain an important financing source 
proved by relatively strong direct effect. The non-monotonic relationship of the previous 
theoretical literature relies partially on the existence of the totally unconstrained firms with 
zero sensitivity. Contrary to simulated sample, where unconstrained firms by definition have 
zero sensitivity, in real world none of the firms operate in perfect market conditions.
The non-monotonic relationship proved in this paper is valid also under the conditions 
of market imperfections as showed by the three types of constrained firms. We provide both
theoretical and empirical evidence for the non-monotonic investment-cash flow sensitivity 
from a new perspective. The estimated cash flow sensitivity of investment led us to conclude
that financing conditions may determine investment and growth of the European firms.
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Table 1. Firm-years’ classification
Financing condition
(% from total)
Total 
investment
Financing 
gap
Changes in Long-
term debt
Changes in 
Short-term debt
Firm-years financed by internal capital (I.)
1. (10%) %  0 %  0 $  0 $  0
2. (19%) <  0 - $  0
Firm-years financed by short-term external capital (II.)
1. (8%) %  0 <  0 < 0 -
2. (24%) %  0 %  0 $   0 >  0
3. (3%) <  0 - >  0 -
Firm-years financed by long-term external capital (III.)
1. (20%) %  0 <  0 %  0 -
2. (16%) %  0 %  0 >  0 -
Note: Static classification of firms based on their accounting characteristics.
Table 2. Firms’ classification 
Final outcome No. of observation(firm-years) No. of firms % o firms
Absolutely constrained firms (I.)
6,709 1,112 21%
Partially constrained firms (II.)
17,266 2,767 54%
Least constrained firms (III.)
7,524 1,252 25%
Note: Summary statistics of final firms' classification based on the dynamics of financial 
constraints.
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Table 3. Summary statistics
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. P-value 
.).( III =
P-value 
.).( IIIII =
1. Firms’ size (logarithm of total assets) 0.00 0.00
.I 10.745 10.705 1.732
.II 11.198 11.041 1.725
.III 11.758 11.584 1.870
2.  Firms’ total investment to beginning of year total assets 0.00 0.00
.I 0.078 0.048 0.187
.II 0.130 0.099 0.179
.III 0.167 0.127 0.188
3. Sales’ growth 0.00 0.00
.I 0.036 0.029 0.202
.II 0.072 0.060 0.176
.III 0.099 0.081 0.180
4. Cash flow to the beginning of year total assets 0.00 0.00
.I 0.088 0.079 0.077
.II 0.100 0.090 0.072
.III 0.114 0.102 0.075
5. Obtained long-term credit to the beginning of period total assets 0.00 0.00
.I -0.007 0.00 0.044
.II - 0.001 0.00 0.058
.III 0.024 0.001 0.074
6. Obtained short-term credit to the beginning of period  total assets 0.00 0.23
.I -0.003 0.00 0.064
.II 0.016 0.002 0.082
.III 0.015 0.000 0.072
7. Leverage (total debt to total assets) 0.00 0.00
.I 0.143 0.080 0.165
.II 0.230 0.212 0.163
.III 0.257 0.245 0.186
8. Cost of credit (interest payments to total debt) 0.00 0.00
.I 0.150 0.091 0.161
.II 0.116 0.076 0.125
.III 0.098 0.065 0.115
Note: Firms’ total investment is calculated as investment in fixed and current assets plus depreciation.
Cash flow is defined as profit for the period plus depreciation. Sales growth is calculated as the first 
difference of the logarithm of annual sales. The obtained credits are calculated as the yearly change of 
the financial debt. Interest payments include all interest paid and similar charges in the given year. We
assign the letter .I  for absolutely constrained firms, .II  for partially constrained firms and .III  for the 
least constrained firms. We test the hypothesis that the mean value of variables of one group is not 
significantly different across firm groups using a t-test. P values of t-test are presented in the last two 
columns.
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Table 4. Summary statistics of variables used in regressions
No. of Obs. Mean Med. Stand.Dev. Min. Max.
All type of firms
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
Inv
31,434 0.13 0.10 0.19 -0.36 1.47
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
CF
31,499 0.10 0.09 0.07 -0.17 0.45
tis ,- 25,129 0.07 0.06 0.18 -0.82 1.29
1,1, 8.0log ## # titi sTA 25,129 2.01 1.95 0.77 -1.48 8.35
Err.Corr.Term 25,129 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.029
.I
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
Inv
6,685 0.08 0.05 0.19 -0.36 1.41
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
CF
6,709 0.09 0.08 0.08 -0.16 0.45
tis ,- 6,709 0.04 0.03 0.20 -0.82 1.27
1,1, 8.0log ## # titi sTA 5,278 1.81 1.76 0.76 -1.48 3.49
Err.Corr.Term 5,278 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.029
.II
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
Inv
17,242 0.13 0.10 0.18 -0.36 1.47
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
CF
17,266 0.10 0.09 0.07 -0.17 0.45
tis ,- 17,266 0.07 0.06 0.18 -0.81 1.29
1,1, 8.0log ## # titi sTA 13,878 1.977 1.939 0.717 -0.433 7.386
Err.Corr.Term 13,878 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.023
.III
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
Inv
7,507 0.17 0.13 0.19 -0.36 1.46
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
CF
7,524 0.11 0.10 0.08 -0.17 0.45
tis ,- 7,524 0.10 0.08 0.18 -0.81 1.26
1,1, 8.0log ## # titi sTA 5,973 2.24 2.16 0.85 -0.34 8.35
Err.Corr.Term 5,973 0.012 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.024
Note: 
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
Inv
 is the total investment of the firm at time it, measured as the change in fixed and non-
cash current assets plus depreciation divided by the beginning of period total assets. tiCF , denotes the 
current cash flow calculated as the profit for the period (profit after tax plus extraordinary profit) plus 
depreciation and tis ,-  is the first difference of the logarithm of sales. 1,log #tiTA  and 1, #tis refer to the first 
lag of the logarithm of total assets and sales. The Er.Corr.Term is the first lagged estimated residuals of 
the equation tiititi sTA ,,,log +/0" +++= , where 1,log #tiTA and tis , refer to the logarithm of total assets 
and sales. i/ and ti,+ represent the firm fixed effects and a random disturbance, respectively.
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Table 5. Error correction model - Two step estimates
Dependent variable:
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
Inv
.I .II .III
Intercept -0.295(-0.21)
0.120
(0.08)
0.188
(0.43)
2,
1,
#
#
ti
ti
TA
Inv
-0.230
(-1.26)
-0.157
(-1.03)
-0.004
(-0.04)
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
CF 0.960
(2.71)***
1.153
(3.68)***
0.793
(2.21)**
tis ,-
0.387
(2.31)**
0.264
(2.09)**
0.393
(2.73)***
1,1, 8.0log ## # titi sTA
-0.013
(-0.24)
-0.069
(-1.43)
-0.029
(-0.97)
N 5,266 13,860 5,962
Hansen test - 12 (prob.) 43.0( 0.30)
48.1
(0.15)
40.2
(0.42)
AR(1) – z statistic (prob.) -2.56(0.01)
-2.55
(0.01)
-4.44
(0.00)
AR(2) – z statistic (prob.) -0.78(0.44)
-0.72
(0.47)
0.78
(0.43)
Note: We assign the letter .I  for absolutely constrained firms, .II  for partially constrained firms and .III
for the least constrained firms. Two-step system GMM estimates are presented with finite-sample 
correction to the two-step covariance matrix (robust standard errors). 
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
Inv is the total investment of the 
firm i at time t, measured as the change in fixed and non-cash current assets plus depreciation divided by 
the beginning of period total assets. tiCF , denotes the current cash flow calculated as the profit for the 
period (profit after tax plus extraordinary profit) plus depreciation and tis ,- is the first difference of the 
logarithm of sales. 
tiTA ,log  and tis , refer to the logarithm of total assets and sales. All regressions 
include a set of industry, time and country dummies (not reported). Instruments are the 3rd lags of the 
dependent and independent variables. The 2nd lag of the error correction term is used as an instrument 
only in the level equation. Industry and time dummies are also taken as strictly exogenous instruments for 
the level equation. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%. 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6. Robustness: alternative error correction term specification 
Dependent variable:  
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
Inv
.I .II .III
Intercept 0.163(0.11)
-0.418
(-0.26)
0.174
(0.39)
2,
1,
#
#
ti
ti
TA
Inv
-0.146
(-0.80)
-0.173
(-1.15)
-0.048
(-0.49)
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
CF 0.959
(3.11)***
1.341
(4.55)***
0.951
(3.01)***
tis ,-
0.141
(1.09)
0.268
(2.13)**
0.391
(2.85)***
Err.Corr.Term -4.804(-0.31)
-7.312
(-0.99)
2.524
(0.39)
N 5,266 13,860 5,962
Hansen test - 12 (prob.) 49.1( 0.13)
41.6
(0.20)
45.1
(0.15)
AR(1) – z statistic (prob.) -2.64(0.00)
-2.09
(0.04)
-2.79
(0.01)
AR(2) – z statistic (prob.) -0.95(0.34)
-0.49
(0.63)
-0.75
(0.46)
Note: We assign the letter .I  for absolutely constrained firms, .II  for partially constrained firms and .III
for the least constrained firms. Two-step system GMM estimates are presented with finite-sample 
correction to the two-step covariance matrix (robust standard errors). 
1,
,
#ti
ti
TA
Inv is the total investment of the 
firm i at time t, measured as the change in fixed and non-cash current assets plus depreciation divided by 
the beginning of period total assets. tiCF , denotes the current cash flow calculated as the profit for the 
period (profit after tax plus extraordinary profit) plus depreciation and tis ,- is the first difference of the 
logarithm of sales. The Err.Corr.Term is the first lagged estimated residuals of the equation 
tiititi sTA ,,,log +/0" +++= , where tiTA ,log  and tis , refer to the logarithm of total assets and sales. 
i/ and ti ,+ represent the firm fixed effects and a random disturbance, respectively. All regressions 
include a set of industry, time and country dummies (not reported). Instruments are the 3rd lags of the 
dependent and independent variables. The 2nd lag of the error correction term is used as an instrument 
only in the level equation. Industry and time dummies are also taken as strictly exogenous instruments for 
the level equation. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%. 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Figure 1. The profit function is increasing up to the first-best investment and decreasing afterwards.
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Appendix:
Table A1. Sample selection
Selection criteria
Size
No. of firms
1995-2004
Size
No. of firm-years
1995-2004
1. 
Non-financial sectors, excluding 
agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
mining, government sectors and 
undetermined sectors
(not in A, B, C , J, L, M, N, O, P, 
Q) 7
15,145 69,136
2. 
Exclusion of firms with Inactive 
legal status8 14,852 67,865
3. 
Firms with consistent balance 
sheet at 5% (i.e. 5% deviation is 
allowed) and cash and cash 
equivalent$other current assets 
(when available)
14,227 65,434
4. 
Trimming of the variables of main 
interest: logarithm of total assets, 
total assets growth, sales growth, 
total investment, cash flow to 
beginning of period total assets 
and short/long term borrowings
14,152 61,799
5.
Exclusion of observations with 
missing growth variables (total 
assets and sales growth)-first year 
of each firm plus observations 
following a year gap
11,114 43,148
6.
Minimum of three consecutive 
years per company 5,131 31,499
7 A-Agriculture and related service activities, B-Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms, C-Mining and 
quarrying, J-Financial intermediation, L-Public administration and defence, compulsory social security, M-
Education, N-Health and social work, O-Other community, social and personal service activities, P-Private 
households with employed persons, Q- Extra-territorial organisations and bodies
8
*Selected firms with legal status defined as Active, Active (default of payments), Active (receivership) or not 
available. Excluded those under legal status defined as Bankruptcy, Dissolved, Dissolved (demerger), Dissolved 
(merger), In liquidation, Inactive (no precision), Credito incobrable, Naar buitenland, Not classified, Not defined,
Removed.
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Table A2. Country coverage
Size
No. of observations
Percentage from 
total
1. Austria 75 0%
2. Belgium 991 3%
3. Finland 6,893 22%
4. France 5,583 18%
5. Germany 1,661 5%
6. Italy 4,055 13%
7. Luxemburg 21 0%
8. Netherlands 8,616 27%
9. Portugal 621 2%
10. Spain 2,983 9%
Table A3. Observations per years
Size
No. of observations
1. 1995 1,036
2. 1996 1,772
3. 1997 2,482
4. 1998 3,006
5. 1999 3,693
6. 2000 4,074
7. 2001 4,602
8. 2002 4,410
 9. 2003 3,470
10 2004 2,954
Table A4. Firm distribution by market quotation
Size
No. of observations
Percentage from 
total 
1. Listed 6,993 22%
2. Unlisted 24,506 78%
Table A5: Industry distribution
Size
No. of observations
Percentage from 
total
1. Construction 2,475 8%
2. Manufacturing 8,817 28%
3. Utilities 2,343 7%
4. Wholesale and retail sales 7,326 23%
5. Transport and communication 1,947 6%
6. Services (business activities, hotels 
and restaurants) 8,591 27%
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